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NOTES 
DNA IS DIFFERENT: 
AN EXPLORATION OF THE CURRENT 
INADEQUACIES OF GENETIC PRIVACY 
PROTECTION IN RECREATIONAL 
DNA DATABASES 
JAMIE M. ZEEVI† 
“You may never commit a crime.  But how should you feel if your 
DNA was used to locate a distant relative who did?”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Joseph James DeAngelo Jr., more infamously known as the 
Golden State Killer,2 committed at least one hundred burglaries, 
raped at least fifty women, and murdered at least twelve people 
between 1974 and 1986.3  It took law enforcement officials more 
than forty years to identify him.4  Ray Charles Waller, recently 
identified as the NorCal Rapist, attacked and raped at least eleven 
 
† Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2020, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Washington University in St. Louis. With many 
thanks to my family for their unwavering love, support, and encouragement, and to 
the members and editors of the St. John’s Law Review for their hard work and 
assistance in preparing my Note for publication. 
1 Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer is Tracked  
Through a Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-
genealogy.html.  
2 While most widely known as the Golden State Killer, DeAngelo has also been 
“variously called the East Area Rapist, Original Nightstalker, Diamond Knot Killer 
and Visalia Ransacker . . . .” Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, 
Investigators First Found His Great-Great-Great-Grandparents, WASH. POST  
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/to-find-alleged-
golden-state-killer-investigators-first-found-his-great-great-great-grandparents/ 
2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b2-0bec548d501f_story.html. 
3 Id.; see also Benjy Egel, Here’s the String of Crimes Tied to the East Area Rapist 
in Years of California Terror, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 29, 2018, 4:52 AM), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article209788654.html. 
4 Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
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women between 1991 and 2006.5  It took law enforcement officials 
more than twenty-seven years to identify him.6  William Earl 
Talbott II was arrested in May 2018 for a double murder 
committed thirty years earlier, in 1987.7 
In each of these cases, investigators identified the suspects 
using a technique called “familial DNA searching,”8 by which 
investigators match DNA found at crime scenes to the DNA of 
family members in DNA databases.9  While conducting familial 
DNA searches in criminal DNA databases like the Combined DNA 
Index System (“CODIS”) is still a relatively new technique,10 
conducting such searches in recreational DNA databases is brand 
new.11  And this is only the beginning.  For example, as of May 
 
5 See Sam Stanton, Benjy Egel, Darrell Smith & Cynthia Hubert, NorCal Rapist 
Suspect Arrested. He’s a 58-Year-Old Safety Specialist at UC Berkeley, SACRAMENTO 
BEE (Sept. 23, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article 
218793610.html.  
6 See id. 
7 See Caleb Hutton & Rikki King, Suspect Arrested in 1987 Deaths of Young 
Couple From BC, HERALD NET (Everett, Wa.) (May 18, 2018, 8:55 PM), 
https://www.heraldnet.com/news/suspect-arrested-in-1987-deaths-of-young-couple-
from-bc/. 
8 Tina Hesman Saey, New Genetic Sleuthing Tools Helped Track Down  
the Golden State Killer Suspect, SCI. NEWS (Apr. 29, 2018, 9:49 AM), 
https://www.sciencenews.org/article/golden-state-killer-suspect-dna-genetics-
genealogy (“Investigators . . . used a public genealogy database, GEDmatch, to 
connect crime scene evidence to distant relatives of Joseph James DeAngelo.”); 
Stanton et al., supra note 5 (“The investigation was nearly a carbon copy of the one 
that led authorities to . . . Joseph James DeAngelo. . . . [I]nvestigators . . . entered 
DNA from the NorCal Rapist crime scenes into a ‘genetic genealogy’ website called 
GEDmatch . . . .”); Hutton & King, supra note 7 (“[William Earl Talbott] was 
determined to be the only potential suspect through . . . the same technique used to 
find the suspected Golden State Killer . . . .”). 
9 See Frederick R. Bieber, Charles H. Brenner & David Lazer, Finding Criminals 
Through DNA of Their Relatives, 312 SCI. 1315, 1315 (2006). 
10 United States’ national forensic DNA database, CODIS, was formally 
established in 1994. Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2019). Familial searching in forensic DNA databases was first used 
in the United Kingdom in 2001 to identify Joseph Kappen as the Saturday  
Night Strangler. Science of the Future: Identifying Criminals Through Their  
Family Members, DNA FORENSICS, http://www.dnaforensics.com/familialsearches. 
aspx#kappen (last visited Aug. 29, 2019); see also Kevin Toolis, The Hunt for the 
Saturday Night Strangler, THE GUARDIAN (London) (Jan. 17, 2003, 7:48 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2003/jan/18/weekend.kevintoolis. The first 
United States case solved using this method to search in CODIS was solved in 2009. 
See Jim Spellman, Using Relative’s DNA Cracks Crime, but Privacy Questions Raised, 
CNN (Nov. 18, 2009, 3:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/17/colorado. 
family.dna/index.html. 
11 See The Golden State Killer case was the first successful use of familial 
searching in a recreational DNA database. Dan Vergano & Virginia Hughes, A Serial 
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2018, Parabon NanoLabs, a forensic DNA analysis company, had 
already uploaded about one hundred crime scene DNA samples to 
GEDmatch and found third cousin or closer matches for twenty  
of these samples.12  As the use of familial DNA searching in 
recreational DNA databases becomes a more prevalent tool  
in forensic investigations, consideration must be given to 
individuals’ genetic privacy, and statutory protections must be 
implemented regarding law enforcement’s access to, and use of,  
this information. 
Throughout the United States, hobbyists and curious 
individuals are voluntarily “buil[ding a] . . . genetic panopticon” in 
recreational DNA databases, using services like AncestryDNA, 
23andMe, MyHeritage DNA, and FamilyTreeDNA, among  
others, to do so.13  Furthermore, public recreational websites like 
GEDmatch provide people the opportunity to upload their raw 
DNA data for free in order to cross-reference their results with the 
results of individuals who have used similar services from other 
companies.14  While exploring genealogy to discover where one’s 
ancestors came from, to build one’s family tree, or to connect with  
 
 
 
Killer Was Caught Because Investigators Found His Family’s DNA on a Website, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 27, 2018, 10:33 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ 
danvergano/serial-killer-dna-testing. 
12 Sarah Zhang, The Coming Wave of Murders Solved by Genealogy, THE 
ATLANTIC (May 19, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/05/the-
coming-wave-of-murders-solved-by-genealogy/560750/ [hereinafter Zhang, The 
Coming Wave of Murders Solved]. These numbers continue to grow. Parabon 
NanoLabs stated that as of December 2018, it had uploaded over two hundred DNA 
profiles to GEDmatch. Megan Molteni, The Future of Crime-Fighting is Family Tree 
Forensics, WIRED (Dec. 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-future-
of-crime-fighting-is-family-tree-forensics/. In 2018, genetic genealogy was used as a 
tool in two hundred cases. As of December 2019, genealogy searches in GEDmatch 
helped “law enforcement [to] solv[e] over 70 cold cases in the U.S.” Kameran Wong,  
A Message to Verogen Customers about the GEDmatch Partnership, VEROGEN (Dec. 
10, 2019), https://verogen.com/a-message-to-verogen-customers-about-the-gedmatch-
partnership/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
13 Matt Ford, How the Supreme Court Could Rewrite the Rules for DNA Searches, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 30, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148170/supreme-
court-rewrite-rules-dna-searches; see also Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the  
Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-year-consumer-dna-
testing-blew-up/.  
14 See Susan Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means for Your Genetic 
Privacy, CNN (May 1, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/27/health/ 
golden-state-killer-genetic-privacy/index.html [hereinafter Scutti, What the Golden 
State Killer Case Means].  
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one’s distant or long-lost relatives may be exciting, unrestricted 
access to this DNA data may result in unwarranted invasions of 
people’s privacy. 
It is possible to discern from one person’s DNA the identities 
of others to whom that person is biologically related.15  Each 
individual in a DNA database is like “a beacon that illuminates 
hundreds of distant relatives . . . . [I]t’s enough to have your third 
cousin or your second cousin once-removed in these databases to 
actually identify you.”16  In fact, a recent study suggests that the 
DNA in these databases will soon have the potential to identify 
nearly everyone.17  Beginning with a DNA database containing 
samples from 1.3 million individuals, investigators were able to 
narrow a person’s identity to fewer than twenty individuals simply 
by inputting “basic information such as someone’s rough age.”18  
Notably, this study found that this search method has the 
potential to identify sixty percent of Americans with European 
heritage regardless of whether many of those people had ever 
submitted their genetic information to a recreational DNA 
database.19  For perspective, 23andMe boasts more than five 
 
15 See Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the Fourth Amendment When DNA Collected for 
One Purpose is Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289, 1294 (2011) (“A partial 
match between two DNA samples indicates that the two donors have a common 
genetic lineage.”). “A sibling shares half of [one’s] genetic profile. A cousin shares an 
eighth.” Carolyn Johnson, Even If You’ve Never Taken a DNA Test, A Distant 
Relative’s Could Reveal Your Identity, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2018/10/11/even-if-youve-never-taken-dna-
test-distant-relatives-could-reveal-your-identity/. Furthermore, information gleaned 
from one person’s DNA can disclose information about the rest of that person’s family. 
See Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1. 
16 Rob Stein, Easy DNA Identifications With Genealogy Databases Raise Privacy 
Concerns, NPR (Oct. 11, 2018, 3:58 PM), (quoting Yaniv Erlich), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/health-shots/2018/10/11/656268742/easy-dna-identifications-with-
genealogy-databases-raise-privacy-concerns. Yaniv Erlich is an expert in the field of 
computational human genetics, as well as a New York Genome Center Core  
Member and an Associate Professor of Computer Science and Computational Biology  
at Columbia University. COLUMBIA UNIV. DATA SCI. INST., https://datascience. 
columbia.edu/yaniv-erlich (last visited Sep. 15, 2019). He is also the Chief  
Science Officer at MyHeritage. MyHeritage Management Team, MYHERITAGE, 
https://www.myheritage.com/management/yaniv_erlich (last visited Sep. 15, 2019). 
17 Jocelyn Kaiser, We Will Find You: DNA Search Used to Nab Golden State Killer 
Can Home in on About 60% of White Americans, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/we-will-find-you-dna-search-used-nab-
golden-state-killer-can-home-about-60-white (“In a few years, it’s really going be 
everyone.” (quoting Yaniv Erlich)).  
18 Id. 
19 Malcolm Ritter, Study: DNA Websites Cast Broad Net for Identifying People, 
MED. XPRESS (Oct. 11, 2018), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-10-dna-websites-
broad-net-people.html. This study was conducted using DNA samples of individuals 
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million customers, while AncestryDNA boasts ten million,20 and 
GEDmatch has stated that it sees almost one thousand new 
uploads per day.21  And these are just a few of all the recreational 
DNA services currently available.  
Furthermore, government, law enforcement, and the general 
public currently have wide access to the DNA collected and stored 
in public recreational DNA databases like GEDmatch.  In fact, 
until the news broke explaining the method investigators used to 
identify the Golden State Killer, even the operators of GEDmatch 
were unaware that police could use such websites for criminal 
investigations, illustrating how little people consider the 
ramifications of submitting their raw DNA data to such websites.22  
As recreational genealogy services become increasingly popular, 
law enforcement will likely become more enthusiastic about the 
investigation potential that familial searching in these databases 
holds.  While familial searching may be an effective way to catch 
violent criminals, the use of familial DNA in forensic 
investigations is a new legal frontier, and regulations of whose 
DNA data may be accessed or used, by whom, when, and how, are 
spotty and unclear.23  In fact, there are currently no legal 
restrictions on familial searching in recreational DNA databases.24 
 
 
with European descent, as this was the largest group in the database used. Id. 
GEDmatch’s database currently “only encompasses about 0.5% of the U.S. adult 
population. . . . Once the GEDmatch figure rises to 2%, more than 90% of people of 
European descent will have a third cousin or closer relative and could be found in this 
way.” Kaiser, supra note 17. FamilyTreeDNA, a site similar to GEDmatch, also allows 
law enforcement to use its databases to conduct familial searching, which “roughly 
doubles the number of genetic profiles cops may use.” Kristen V. Brown,  
No One is Safeguarding Your DNA, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 2019, 5:18 PM), 
https://www.bloombergquint.com/businessweek/law-enforcement-can-do-whatever-it-
likes-with-consumer-dna-data. 
20 Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1.  
21 Molteni, supra note 12. 
22 See Justin Jouvenal, Mark Berman, Drew Harwell & Tom Jackman, A 
Genealogy Site Led Police to the Golden State Killer. Who Else Can Tap Into This DNA 
‘Treasure Trove’?, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 28, 2018, 4:47 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/nationworld/ct-golden-state-killer-dna-implications-20180428-story.html. 
23 For example, some states allow familial searching in forensic DNA databases, 
and some do not. Sarah Zhang, How A Tiny Website Became the Police’s  
Go-To Genealogy Database, THE ATLANTIC (June 1, 2018), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-genealogy-database/561695/ 
[hereinafter Zhang, How A Tiny Website]. 
24 See Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14 (“[L]egally, 
it’s the Wild West when it comes to commercial genetic testing companies.”). 
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The lack of legal restrictions and regulations on the use of 
recreational DNA databases is concerning, as there is nothing to 
prevent the potential abuse of this practice by law enforcement or 
by civilians.25  First, the current lack of restrictions allows this 
technique to be utilized to investigate any crime at any time.  
While supporters argue that this technique is helpful in solving 
violent murder and rape cases, there is currently “no downward 
limit” on when or on which types of crimes law enforcement may 
use familial DNA searching in recreational databases.26  Familial 
DNA searching was recently used for the first time as a tool in an 
assault investigation.27  Once police identified the suspect, a 
seventeen-year-old high school student, police directed the school 
resource officer to surveil the student in the cafeteria and to collect 
the student’s discarded milk and juice cartons for use in 
confirming the DNA match.28  The school resource officer did so.29  
It is not a far leap from using familial DNA searching in murder 
and rape investigations to using it in assault investigations.  It is 
also not difficult to imagine the next leap—the use of the technique 
in petty crime investigations. 
 
 
25 See Stein, supra note 16 (“The police currently [are] using these techniques to 
find . . . [murderers] and bad people, . . . But are we OK with using this technique to 
identify people in a political demonstration who left their DNA behind?”); see also Nila 
Bala, We’re Entering a New Phase in Law Enforcement’s Use of Consumer Genetic 
Data, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.slate.com/technology/2019/ 
12/gedmatch-verogen-genetic-genealogy-law-enforcement.html (noting unsettling 
possibilities “including having our genes held ransom,” and “people pretending to be 
our relatives asking for our help”); Paige St. John, DNA Genealogical Databases are a 
Gold Mine for Police, but with Few Rules and Little Transparency, L.A. TIMES  
(Nov. 24, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-11-24/law-
enforcement-dna-crime-cases-privacy (“In Texas, police met search guidelines by 
classifying a case as sexual assault but after an arrest only filed charges of burglary. 
[In California], prosecutors have persuaded a judge to treat unsuspecting genetic 
contributors as "confidential informants" and seal searches so consumers are not 
scared away from adding their own DNA to the forensic stockpile.”). While beyond the 
scope of this Note, because the DNA in recreational databases is not legally protected, 
it is also foreseeable that familial searching in websites like GEDmatch may be used 
by drug and insurance companies to do things like targeting advertising or  
building out “vast networks of relatedness to determine [insurance] risk.” Brown, 
supra note 19. 
26 Elizabeth Joh, Want to See My Genes? Get A Warrant, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/opinion/police-dna-warrant.html. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. 
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Second, there is currently no legal recourse for someone whose 
DNA, or whose genetic relatives’ DNA, was utilized in a criminal 
investigation.30  No clear remedies exist for “mistakes, the 
discovery of embarrassing or intrusive information, or misuse of 
the information.”31  Furthermore, law enforcement increasingly 
outsources its familial DNA searching to forensic companies and 
individual genetic genealogists.32  However, genetic genealogy is a 
profession that currently has neither formal rules nor “academic 
training or certification program[s],” to ensure the quality of work 
provided.33  Law enforcement’s unrestricted use of familial DNA 
searching in recreational databases and its outsourcing of this 
work, combined with the tremendously revealing nature of DNA, 
creates the perfect storm for errors, abuse, or both. 
Additionally, relatives of individuals who voluntarily submit 
their DNA samples to recreational genealogy websites do not have 
adequate means available to protect their own genetic privacy.  
Current constitutional and statutory protections do not protect 
voluntarily submitted DNA stored in recreational DNA databases.  
Moreover, traditional understandings of the legal considerations 
around privacy do not map onto DNA data.  DNA is different.  
Given our lack of knowledge regarding the potential of DNA as 
well as the lack of regulations regarding the use of this DNA data, 
it is imperative that statutory protections are implemented.  
Part I of this Note discusses the fundamental science behind 
DNA and defines and explains the process of familial DNA 
searching.  Part I also discusses how Carpenter v. United States 
provides a framework to begin thinking about the unique nature 
of DNA and privacy implications for its use, and why the revealing 
nature of this type of data warrants protection.  Part II of this Note 
delves into the lack of constitutional and statutory protections for 
DNA in recreational DNA databases.  First, Part II explains that 
traditional Fourth Amendment concepts, like search warrants, 
probable cause, reasonable expectation of privacy, third-party 
doctrine, and consent, do not adequately protect or map onto DNA 
stored in recreational databases.  Next, Part II highlights the 
complete absence of statutory protections for the forensic use of 
 
30 Molteni, supra note 12. 
31 Joh, supra note 26.  
32 See Laura Hautala, How Sharing Your DNA Solves Horrible Crimes . . . and 
Stirs A Privacy Debate, CNET (July 2, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/ 
how-sharing-your-dna-solves-horrible-crimes-and-stirs-a-privacy-debate. 
33 Id.  
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DNA in this particular context.  Part III assesses the strength of 
common arguments intended to minimize the necessity of 
statutory protection and concludes that they are not persuasive.  
Such arguments include the strong government interest in being 
able to use familial searching to solve and prevent crimes, the 
anonymization of DNA samples to resolve privacy concerns, and 
the work-intensive nature of familial searching in these databases 
tending to decrease the likelihood that the technique would be 
used frequently.  Finally, Part IV asserts that statutory protection 
is the appropriate solution and that it is imperative to protect the 
genetic information of individuals stored in recreational DNA 
databases against invasive use by government actors.  Part IV also 
provides an overview of possible regulations. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. DNA and Familial DNA Searching Defined 
DNA, which makes up genes,34 “is an information-rich 
material contained in every cell in our bodies,” and defines who we 
are in the most fundamental way.35  To identify individuals in 
CODIS using their DNA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) analyzes short tandem repeats, also known as STRs or 
“ ‘junk’ genes.”36  STRs “can be repeated dozens or hundreds of 
times” throughout an individual’s genome, and the number of 
repeats varies from individual to individual.37  These junk genes 
are valuable to the FBI mainly for their ability to identify 
individuals, as they do not appear to reveal historical medical or 
clinical information about a person.38  “Each [CODIS] profile looks 
for STRs in up to 20 locations in the human genome.”39  In contrast, 
recreational DNA databases do not use STRs and instead use 
single nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”), which look for 
 
34 What is a Gene?, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., 
GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/gene (last visited 
Sep. 15, 2019).  
35 Lowenberg, supra note 15, at 1292. 
36 Lowenberg, supra note 15, at 1293; Erin Murphy, Law and Policy Oversight of 
Familial Searches in Recreational Genealogy Databases, 292 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e5, 
e5 (2018). “The adjective ‘junk’ may mislead the layperson, for in fact this is the DNA 
region used with near certainty to identify a person.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 
442 (2013). 
37 Zhang, How a Tiny Website, supra note 23. 
38 Murphy, supra note 36, at e5.  
39 Zhang, How a Tiny Website, supra note 23. 
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information at about 600,000 locations in the genome.40  SNPs are 
rich in information,41 and at the very least can be used to trace  
a person’s heritage, identify distant relatives,42 predict  
physical appearance, and forecast future wellness and disease 
propensities.43  And the use of SNPs by recreational services 
makes sense when one remembers that “[p]eople submit their 
DNA to sites like 23andMe or MyHeritage because they want to 
know more about their genetic make-up than just identity.”44 
Whether STRs or SNPs are analyzed, a familial DNA search 
is defined as “an intentional or deliberate search of [a DNA] 
database conducted after a routine search for the purpose of 
potentially identifying close biological relatives of [an] unknown 
forensic sample associated with [a] crime scene profile.”45  In order 
to conduct a familial search in a DNA database, investigators first 
convert recovered crime scene DNA into raw DNA data.46  They 
then submit this raw data into a DNA database with the aim of 
getting a partial match, which would indicate a genetic relative.47  
If a partial match is made, investigators painstakingly build out 
the perpetrator’s genetic family tree48 and utilize records to zero in 
on which family members were of the “right age and in the right 
place to have committed the crime.”49  Once suspects are identified, 
investigators will work to obtain DNA samples from the suspects 
“through . . . court order[s] or by surreptitious means”50 like  
 
 
 
 
40 Id. 
41 Murphy, supra note 36, at e5. 
42 Zhang, How a Tiny Website, supra note 23. 
43 Murphy, supra note 36, at e5. 
44 Id. 
45 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU  
OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ 
codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 18, 2019). 
46 Nicole L. Cvetnic, How Police Use DNA ‘Familial Searches’ to Probe Murders, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 27, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/ 
crime/article217427845.html. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Doug Stevens & Maura Dolan, How Familial DNA Searches Work, L.A.  
TIMES (May 9, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-g-familial-dna-how-
it-works-20180426-story.html; see also Brown, supra note 19 (“The true power of 
genetic information . . . is realized in conjunction with other online data culled 
from . . . public records and social networks.”). 
50 Cvetnic, supra note 46. 
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surveilling suspects and collecting discarded items that may 
contain DNA samples.51  Finally, an individual is confirmed as a 
suspect if the crime scene DNA matches the collected DNA.52 
Because CODIS uses STRs, if a familial search in CODIS 
identifies any partial matches at all, the number will be relatively 
low.  This is because these searches are only capable of identifying 
“potential sibling[s], parent[s], or child[ren] of the target,” whose 
DNA profiles are already in the CODIS database because they 
have also come into contact with the criminal justice system.53  
Additionally, basic identification information is nearly the only 
information available to investigators regarding the individuals 
affected by these searches.54  By contrast, because recreational 
DNA services use SNPs, experts have estimated that the number 
of partial matches can exceed hundreds, if not thousands, of 
potential relatives because SNP searches “produce[] leads much 
farther out—to ‘relatives’ unlikely to know of each other’s 
relatedness.”55  Significantly, investigators will have access to vast 
amounts of genetic information regarding the individuals affected 
by these searches.56 
For more than forty years, investigators exhausted traditional 
investigative options trying to identify a suspect for the crimes 
committed by the Golden State Killer.57  Although “[c]riminal DNA 
databases produced no hits,” GEDmatch did.58  In fact, the search 
in GEDmatch produced between ten and twenty distant cousins.59  
Investigators traced the lineages of these distant cousins to a 
common ancestor that they shared with the Golden State Killer, 
which “turned out to be great-great-great grandparents from the 
early 1800s.”60  They were able to then compile about twenty-five 
“distinct family trees from the great-great-great grandparents,” 
with the branch that contained Joseph James DeAngelo, Jr. 
including more than one thousand family members alone.61 
 
51 Hautala, supra note 32.  
52 Cvetnic, supra note 46. 
53 Murphy, supra note 36, at e6. 
54 See id. at e5 (“Forensic STRs were specifically chosen as “junk” genes—markers 
with little value other than identification.”). 
55 Id. at e6. 
56 See id. 
57 See Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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The Golden State Killer case is a powerful illustration of the 
extensive scope of these searches, how many individuals 
potentially may be included, and why the process of familial DNA 
searching in recreational DNA databases is so intrusive.  The 
genetic information available to investigators belonging to 
presumptively innocent individuals in recreational databases is 
extensive and deeply personal.  In fact, “SNPs have not 
[previously] been used in the criminal justice context” precisely 
because they are so rich in information.62  Furthermore, it is 
currently impossible to fathom all that we will be able to 
understand in the future from an individual’s DNA regarding that 
individual or her genetic familial network.63 
For these reasons and more, including the ability to implicate 
countless individuals with one DNA sample, DNA is different from 
other types of information, and its use for any purpose—especially 
in criminal investigations—must be strictly protected.  While 
there may be a strong public interest rationale for conducting 
familial DNA searches in recreational databases in order to catch 
violent criminals, there must be limits on how, under what 
circumstances, and by whom this DNA can be used to avoid 
potential illegitimate uses.  Because DNA is such a unique type of 
information, how do we begin to think about this type of data and 
whether and how it should be protected and regulated? 
B. Carpenter v. United States as a Framework for Considering 
the Uniqueness of DNA Data  
Carpenter v. United States, decided by the United States 
Supreme Court in June 2018, provides a framework for 
understanding the type of information contained within DNA and 
why it requires protection.  Carpenter concerned an investigation 
in which the FBI obtained location information for Carpenter for 
a four-month period in which it suspected Carpenter had 
committed multiple robberies.64  “Altogether the Government 
obtained 12,898 location points [from Carpenter’s cell phone 
 
62 Murphy, supra note 36, at e5–e6. 
63 For example, forensic experts used DNA “to build three composite images of [a] 
suspect’s likely appearance, an estimate of what he would look like at ages 25, 45, and 
65. . . . The faces are educated guesses, based on genetic makeup of DNA found  
on crime scene evidence.” Caleb Hutton, DNA Analysis Conjures the Possible Face  
of a 1987 Killer, HERALD NET (Everett, Wa.) (Apr. 11, 2018, 8:04 PM), 
https://www.heraldnet.com/news/dna-analysis-conjures-the-possible-face-of-a- 
1987-killer.  
64 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018). 
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carriers,] cataloging Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 
data points per day.”65  Carpenter moved to suppress the cell-site 
location information (“CSLI”), which the Government planned to 
use to prove that Carpenter’s cell phone was near the sites of the 
robberies.66  The case made its way to the Supreme Court, which 
decided that because of the unique nature of CSLI, the government 
invaded Carpenter’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” in his 
“physical movements” when it acquired his CSLI information from 
his wireless carrier.67 
In determining that CSLI is a unique type of data, the Court 
described the role of cell phones today as “almost a ‘feature of 
human anatomy’ ”68 and as “indispensable to participation in 
modern society.”69  CSLI is automatically collected when one uses 
a cell phone “without any affirmative act on the part of the user 
beyond powering up.”70  The Court continued that because CSLI is 
collected from everyone who uses a cell phone, and “not just those 
belonging to persons who might happen to come under 
investigation[,] this newfound tracking capacity runs against 
everyone.”71  Describing the nature of CSLI as “deeply revealing,”72 
“detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled,”73 the Court 
explained that CSLI is capable of “provid[ing] an intimate  
window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular 
movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, [and] 
professional . . . associations,’ ”74 which “hold for many Americans 
the privacies of life.”75 
Furthermore, the Court contrasted traditional searches in 
which police have to establish reasonable suspicion of an 
individual before tracking their movements, with CSLI, which 
boasts a uniquely “retrospective quality.”76  The Court noted that 
with CSLI, “police need not even know in advance whether they 
 
65 Id. 
66 See id. at 2212, 2213. 
67 Id. at 2219. 
68 Id. at 2218 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)). 
69 Id. at 2220. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 2218. 
72 Id. at 2223. 
73 Id. at 2216. 
74 Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
75 Id. at 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
76 See id. at 2218. 
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want to follow a particular individual, or when,” because they have 
the ability to gain access to this information after the fact.77  Due 
to the uniquely extensive and revealing nature of CSLI, as well as 
the availability of CSLI to investigators at any time during an 
investigation, the Court determined that CSLI is particularly 
deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.78 
Read outside the specific factual context of Carpenter, the 
Court’s description of this unique type of information, as well as 
the privacy concerns surrounding it, could just as easily  
be referring to DNA as to CSLI.  While the Court’s analysis in 
Carpenter does not map directly onto DNA or address privacy 
interests in the information of others, DNA data is arguably at 
least as unique as CSLI, if not more so.  Literally a “feature of 
human anatomy,”79 DNA, like CSLI, is a profoundly revealing, 
“detailed, [and] encyclopedic”80 illustration of who an individual is 
at the most fundamental level.  In contrast to CSLI, DNA is not 
capable of detailing where a person—or a cell phone—was located 
at any particular time.  However, DNA provides an even more 
intimate and thorough window into who a person is.  DNA is 
unique in that it has the potential to irrefutably shed light not only 
on a person’s identity, but also on who that person is related to, 
among many other things.  Use of CSLI data does not affect 
countless people.  DNA does.  If the Carpenter Court considers a 
person’s “familial, political, [and] professional . . . associations”81 
to be “privacies of life,”82 a person’s genetic makeup and genetic 
family tree surely must be considered at least as private. 
Furthermore, while using a cell phone may be “indispensable 
to participation in modern society,”83 having DNA is a fact of life.  
We have DNA by virtue of being human beings, and “[w]e leave 
[it] everywhere we go.  Everywhere we touch has DNA.”84  
Moreover, when a distant, unknown relative provides her DNA to 
a genealogy website, information that implicates countless 
individuals is collected “without any affirmative act on the  
 
77 Id. “[T]he retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a category 
of information otherwise unknowable.” Id. 
78 Id. at 2220. 
79 Id. at 2218 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385). 
80 Id. at 2216. 
81 Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
82 Id. at 2217 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 403). 
83 Id. at 2220. 
84 Zhang, How a Tiny Website, supra note 23. 
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part of”85 those individuals.86  As people continue to build out 
recreational DNA databases, “this newfound tracking capacity 
[will] run[] against everyone,”87 because everyone has DNA and 
everyone has genetic relatives.  
Finally, like CSLI, DNA information has a “retrospective 
quality”88 that involves exponentially more individuals—some 
long gone89—as massive recreational DNA databases continue to 
flourish.90  While one person’s CSLI records can tell investigators 
each place where that person’s cell phone was located for the past 
five years,91 one person’s DNA data can reveal far more about that 
person themselves and myriad relatives, past and present.92  Like 
CSLI, this DNA information is preserved in a database until 
someone chooses to use it, or one explicitly requests to have it 
deleted.93  However, a critical difference is that when investigators 
access DNA data from these websites, they access a vast wealth of 
information about countless individuals without any regulation or 
oversight at all.94  In Carpenter, the Court stressed that “the 
progress of science has afforded law enforcement a powerful new 
tool to carry out its important responsibilities.  At the same time, 
this tool risks Government encroachment of the sort the Framers, 
‘after consulting the lessons of history,’ drafted the Fourth 
 
85 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
86 See Stein, supra note 16 (explaining that once a person submits her DNA to a 
recreational service, that person has “made a decision not just for [her]self but for 
[her] siblings, for [her] distant cousins, people [she does not] even know [she is] related 
to, for [her] children, for [her] children's children.” (quoting Erin Murphy) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
87 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
88 Id. 
89 Cf. Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
90 Regalado, supra note 13.  
91 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“[W]ireless carriers . . . maintain records for 
up to five years.”). 
92 See supra Section I.A. 
93 See Erin Brodwin, DNA-Testing Company 23andMe Has Signed a $300 Million 
Deal with a Drug Giant. Here’s How to Delete Your Data If That Freaks You Out, BUS. 
INSIDER (July 25, 2018, 5:27 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/dna-testing-
delete-your-data-23andme-ancestry-2018-7. Depending on the genealogy service used, 
a request to delete DNA information may not be sufficient to entirely remove that 
information from the database. For example, while 23andMe will discard a consumer’s 
DNA sample, the terms of the consent agreement make it unclear whether a 
consumer’s “raw genetic data” will be discarded. Id. Further, while a consumer can 
delete her DNA results from Ancestry.com, the company will not delete the consumer’s 
genetic data from any research projects the consumer previously opted into. Id. Most 
strikingly, Helix can keep a consumer’s DNA “indefinitely.” Id. 
94 See Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14. 
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Amendment to prevent.”95  Thus, DNA in recreational databases, 
like CSLI, is deserving of Fourth Amendment protections.  
Traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, however, is 
inadequate to protect this type of information. 
II. LACK OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROTECTIONS 
In the most fundamental way, DNA makes a person who she 
is.  An individual’s DNA stores that individual’s most personal, 
private secrets—secrets that even she herself may not be aware of.  
Among these many secrets is one that connects her to countless 
genetic relatives, familiar and unfamiliar, past, present, and 
future.96  DNA’s ability to connect us to so many other individuals 
in such an intimate way is something that makes DNA 
particularly unique.  However, because DNA is such a distinctive 
type of information, neither constitutional nor current statutory 
protections adequately protect the genetic privacy interests 
implicated by DNA stored in recreational DNA databases. 
This Section will describe why current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is not protective of genetic privacy in commercial 
DNA databases.  First, the Supreme Court has not addressed 
whether a warrant is necessary before law enforcement obtains 
DNA information from a recreational DNA database.97  Further 
indicating the intrusiveness of familial searching in recreational 
databases is the fact that a familial search will not necessarily 
result in a perpetrator’s identification; rather, the government 
utilizes this investigative technique and obtains sensitive personal 
information without any probable cause to believe that evidence of 
a crime will be found in a recreational database.  Second, current 
jurisprudence focused on reasonable expectations of privacy does 
not protect the DNA stored in recreational databases because, due 
to the nature of DNA, there is a fundamental inability to exclude 
others from information that may be disclosed by, or may 
implicate, any number of genetic relatives.  Third, using the logic 
set out in Carpenter and highlighting DNA’s unique ability to 
implicate others, the third-party doctrine should not be applied  
to DNA stored in recreational DNA databases.  Finally, consent 
 
95 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,  
595 (1948)). 
96 See Stein, supra note 16. 
97 See Ford, supra note 13; cf. Matthew Haag, FamilyTreeDNA Admits to Sharing 
Genetic Data With F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
02/04/business/family-tree-dna-fbi.html; see also infra Section II.A.1.  
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given by customers of recreational DNA services is not truly 
informed consent, and when one individual consents to participate 
in these services she effectively gives consent on behalf of all of her 
past, present, and future genetic relatives.  This Section will also 
describe the current lack of statutory protections for DNA stored 
in recreational databases, and will underscore how the genetic 
privacy of individuals whose DNA is stored in CODIS is currently 
more protected than the genetic privacy of individuals whose DNA 
is stored in recreational databases, which provide a much more 
sophisticated and robust set of data. 
A. Traditional Fourth Amendment Protections Do Not Reach 
DNA Stored in Recreational DNA Databases 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . .”98  The purposes of the Fourth Amendment are “to 
secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’ ”99 and  
“ ‘to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police 
surveillance.’ ”100  As technology has progressed into the era of big 
data and can track, record, and store in the hands of third parties 
seemingly unlimited information about individuals, how we 
protect this type of information must be reconsidered.  As the 
Supreme Court noted in Carpenter, “the Court is obligated—as 
‘[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have 
become available to the Government’—to ensure that the ‘progress 
of science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”101  It is 
time that the law catches up with DNA technology. 
1. Search Warrants and Probable Cause  
While law enforcement is typically required to obtain a search 
warrant supported by probable cause before conducting a search, 
this constitutional prerequisite does not protect the genetic 
privacy of individuals whose DNA is stored in recreational DNA 
databases or whose relatives have submitted their DNA to these 
 
98 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
99 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,  
630 (1886)). 
100 Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
101 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 473, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
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services.  A search under the Fourth Amendment occurs when law 
enforcement “violates a subjective expectation of privacy that 
society recognizes as reasonable.”102  In order to conduct a search 
during a criminal investigation, law enforcement normally must 
obtain a search warrant based on probable cause.103  The probable 
cause requirement demands that police have sufficient 
information to believe that they will likely find evidence of 
criminal activity by conducting a search.104  Probable cause 
embraces the concepts of “individualized suspicion” and 
“antecedent justification.”  The Court in Carpenter noted that 
under the Fourth Amendment, at least some individualized 
suspicion is required before police may conduct a search.105  
Furthermore, in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court 
stressed that antecedent justification, or “an objective 
predetermination of probable cause,” is “central to the Fourth 
Amendment,” and that probable cause cannot be justified after a 
search is complete.106 
Although the Supreme Court has further held that, subject to 
limited exceptions,107 “searches conducted outside the judicial 
process . . . are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment,”108 law enforcement currently may legally conduct 
warrantless familial searching in recreational DNA databases.109  
In Katz, the FBI, without a warrant, placed an electronic recording 
device outside of a public telephone booth where it suspected  
Katz placed illegal telephone calls during which he would 
 
102 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
103 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
104 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (defining probable 
cause as “exist[ing] where ‘the facts and circumstances within [police officers’] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient 
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has 
been or is being committed” (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,  
162 (1925))). 
105 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
106 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358, 359 (1967). 
107 There are seven discrete exceptions to the search warrant requirement. See 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (exigent circumstances); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (consent); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 384 (2014) (search 
incident to lawful arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) 
(automobile); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plain view); Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (reasonable search for weapons, or Terry stops); United 
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (border searches). 
108 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“[T]he Constitution requires ‘that the deliberate 
impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the 
police.’ ” (quoting Wong Sung v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963))).  
109 See Ford, supra note 13; cf. Haag, supra note 97.  
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“transmit[] wagering information” in violation of federal law.110  
The Government argued that these recordings were not obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment because it had established 
probable cause and because the surveillance was limited in scope 
and duration.111  The Court rejected this argument, however, 
finding that this was an illegal search under the Fourth 
Amendment.112  The Court reasoned that it was not enough “that 
officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime 
and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive 
means consistent with that end,”113 because this approach left to 
police discretion whether and how individuals would be protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.114  This reasoning, however, has not 
yet been applied to DNA data stored in recreational databases, 
which is currently protected by rules formulated by and in the 
disretion of the businesses themselves.115  The genetic information 
stored in these databases is “governed by the same privacy laws 
applicable to any consumer product company . . . . It doesn’t have 
any additional levels of safety or security,”116 and law enforcement 
need not necessarily obtain a search warrant prior to conducting a 
search in these databases.117  
 
 
 
 
110 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
111 Id. at 354 (noting that the previous investigation conducted by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation indicated “a strong probability that [Katz] was using the 
telephone” for the criminal activity in question and that agents limited their 
surveillance “to the specific purpose of establishing the contents of [Katz]’s 
unlawful . . . communications,” and thus only surveilled Katz in “brief periods during 
which he used the telephone booth, and took great care to overhear only the 
conversations of [Katz] himself”).  
112 Id. at 358–59. 
113 Id. at 356–57 (emphasis added). 
114 Id. at 356, 358–59 (“[T]he inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed 
by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer.”). 
115 See, e.g., Bala, supra note 25 (“Without guidance from the government on the 
matter, [the founder of GEDmatch] navigated difficult decisions—such as which types 
of crimes law enforcement could use the site to try to solve and whether users should 
have to opt in to or opt out of sharing their data with the police. . . . [O]ne individual 
had the power both to draw th[e] line[s] and to change [them] unilaterally. With no 
legal regulations providing clarity on how and when genetic genealogy should be used 
to fight crime, we have left private entities in charge of the decision-making.”). 
116 Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14 (internal 
quotation omitted). 
117 See Ford, supra note 13; cf. Haag, supra note 97.  
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While some recreational genealogy companies have 
voluntarily chosen to include such protections in their privacy 
policies, such protection is woefully insufficient.118  Services like 
AncestryDNA and 23andMe have stated that they will only share 
information with law enforcement if it is legally compelled.119  
However, their privacy policies appear to leave discretion to the 
companies themselves regarding when to share this information.  
For example, AncestryDNA’s Privacy Statement states that 
Ancestry DNA “may share [a customer’s] Personal Information if 
we believe it is reasonably necessary to . . . [c]omply with valid 
legal process (e.g., subpoenas, warrants).”120  23andMe’s Privacy 
Statement states that “23andMe will preserve and disclose any 
and all information to law enforcement agencies or others if 
required to do so by law or in the good faith belief that such 
preservation or disclosure is reasonably necessary to . . . comply 
with legal or regulatory process . . . .”121  Conversely, GEDmatch 
requires no warrant at all122 and is very upfront in its Terms of 
Service and Privacy Policy, explicitly informing its users that if 
they “require absolute privacy and security” they should not 
provide their information to GEDmatch at all, or should “delete it 
immediately” if they have already provided it.123  
 
118 Brown, supra note 19 (“The only rules [about familial searching in the 
consumer space] are in each company’s terms of service. Even then, there may be little 
a company can realistically do to keep law enforcement agencies—or anyone else—
from using its service however they like.”). 
119 See Jouvenal, Berman, Harwell & Jackman, supra note 22. Regardless of how 
protective recreational genealogy services choose to make their privacy policies, a 
recent ruling in Florida paves the road for law enforcement’s unfettered use of DNA 
stored in recreational databases. In July 2019, Judge Patricia Strowbridge of the 
Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida approved a detective’s request for a search 
warrant to allow him to “override the privacy settings of GEDmatch’s users and search 
the site’s full database.” Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile is 
Private? A Florida Judge Just Said Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-database-search-warrant.html. 
Within twenty-four hours, GEDmatch complied with the warrant. Id. Thus, there now 
exists precedent for future investigators to obtain similar warrants to search within 
even larger databases, like AncestryDNA and 23andMe. Id. (highlighting concern 
among DNA policy experts that such precedent may transform “all genetic databases 
into law enforcement databases”). 
120 Privacy Statement, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacy 
statement (last updated Dec. 23, 2019) (emphasis added). 
121  Privacy Statement, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ (last 
updated Jan. 1, 2020) (emphasis added). 
122 See Ford, supra note 13 (explaining that GEDmatch, an “open-source system[,] 
allowed investigators to avoid the need for a warrant”). 
123 GEDmatch.com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, 
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 2019). On May 18, 2019, 
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Additionally, “[m]any commercial genetic testing company 
contracts with participants ‘have clauses that allow them to 
change their policy as they choose,’ ”124 which underscores the fact 
that this highly sensitive information is not protected in a 
dependable way.  Even companies that tout their commitment to 
consumer privacy may choose at any time to allow investigators to 
 
GEDmatch updated its terms and service to clarify that it accepts law enforcement’s 
use of its service for familial search purposes. Id. (“When you upload Raw Data to 
GEDmatch, you agree that the Raw Data is one of the following: . . . DNA obtained 
and authorized by law enforcement to identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against 
another individual . . . .; [or] DNA obtained and authorized by law enforcement to 
identify remains of a deceased individual.”). At that time, GEDmatch also added a 
“Public + opt-out” feature, allowing individuals’ DNA to be “available for comparison 
to any Raw Data in the GEDmatch database, except DNA kits identified as being 
uploaded for Law Enforcement purposes.” Id. One week later, GEDmatch updated its 
privacy policy again, this time implementing an opt-in option for users to select in 
order to allow law enforcement to utilize their DNA. Natalie Ram, The Genealogy Site 
that Helped Catch the Golden State Killer is Grappling with Privacy, SLATE (May 29, 
2019, 7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/05/gedmatch-dna-privacy-update-
law-enforcement-genetic-geneology-searches.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
Alarmingly, Verogen, Inc., a “forensic genomics company whose focus is on human 
ID,” announced on December 9, 2019 that it had purchased GEDmatch. Email from 
Curtis Rogers, Founder, GEDmatch, to Jamie Zeevi/GEDmatch users (Dec. 19, 2019, 
10:09 PM EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter GEDmatch Email]. Verogen, Inc. 
openly views GEDmatch as not only a recreational DNA database, but as a valuable 
resource for law enforcement. Id. (“Verogen recognizes that law enforcement use of 
genetic genealogy is here to stay . . . .”); see also Bala, supra note 25 (noting that 
Verogen is currently cooperating with the FBI to “create DNA profiles for the National 
DNA Index System,” that Verogen’s Chief Operating Officer has stated that he views 
GEDmatch as “molecular eyewitness” that can be used by law enforcement as a tool 
to solve crimes, and that “selling its services to crime labs” is “explicitly” part of 
Verogen’s business model). Thus, it appears that GEDmatch is more committed than 
ever to cooperating with and assisting law enforcement. 
124 Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14; see Privacy 
Statement, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement (last 
updated Dec. 23, 2019) (“We may modify this Privacy Statement at any time . . . .”); 
Privacy Statement, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ (last updated 
Jan. 1, 2020) (“Whenever this Privacy Statement is changed in a material  
way, a notice will be posted . . . -[and] [a]fter 30 days the changes will become 
effective.”); GEDmatch.com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, 
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 2019) (“We may update the 
GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy at any time.”). For a detailed 
history of past changes made to GEDmatch’s privacy policy, see Bala, supra note 25. 
When Verogen, Inc. purchased GEDmatch, it committed to “fight all unauthorized law 
enforcement use and any warrants that may be issued,” GEDmatch Email, supra note 
123, and announced that “GEDmatch’s terms of service will not change, with  
respect to the use, purposes of processing, and disclosures of user data.” Julian  
Husbands, GEDmatch Partners with Genomics Firm, Verogen (Dec. 9, 2019), 
https://www.verogen.com/gedmatch-partners-with-genomics-firm/ (last visited Jan. 
20, 2020). However, there is nothing to prevent Verogen from changing GEDmatch’s 
policies in the future. Bala, supra note 25.  
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access their databases and even utilize their laboratories.  In 2018, 
for example, FamilyTreeDNA, a company that had actively 
“marketed itself as a leader of consumer privacy and a fierce 
protector of user data” voluntarily allowed the FBI to access its 
DNA databases and to utilize its laboratory for investigations of 
unsolved violent crimes without ever notifying its users.125  It 
became “the first known commercial site to provide some services 
without a subpoena or warrant,”126 as opposed to GEDmatch, 
which is a free, open-source website.127  There is currently no legal 
reason other such commercial sites would not do the same.  
Because there is little uniformity amongst recreational genealogy 
companies’ privacy policies, and because these companies retain 
the power to change these policies at any time, discretion is in the 
hands of these companies whether and how to protect the  
genetic privacy of their users and, by extension, that of their users’ 
genetic relatives.  Like in Katz, where the Court rejected the 
self-restraint argument presented by the Government and deemed 
a warrantless search unconstitutional,128 searches within 
recreational DNA databases must require more stringent  
legal protection. 
Furthermore, when conducting a familial search in a 
recreational DNA database, law enforcement does so without the 
need to establish probable cause.  In fact, law enforcement engages 
in this investigative technique precisely because it cannot 
establish probable cause with respect to an individual.  When 
investigators conduct such a search, they are inputting DNA from 
a crime scene in hopes, but with no guarantee, that a partial match 
will be made.  In this context, while this genetic information is 
being used in a criminal investigation, it will not provide evidence 
of criminal activity; at most, it will provide law enforcement with 
leads.129  Probable cause requires more than this.  Before law 
enforcement conducts a familial search, it has no indication 
whether the search will result in a partial match at all.  Thus, it 
would be nearly impossible to argue that law enforcement would 
be able to demonstrate probable cause to conduct such a search.  
 
125 Haag, supra note 97. This did not become public until 2019. Id. 
126 Id. 
127 See Zhang, How a Tiny Website, supra note 23; Ford, supra note 13. 
128 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1967). 
129 See Eli Rosenberg, Family DNA Searches Seen as Crime-Solving Tool, and 
Intrusion on Rights, NY TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/ 
nyregion/familial-dna-searching-karina-vetrano.html.  
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Finally, familial searching in recreational databases casts a 
wide net that drags in myriad, presumptively innocent, 
individuals who were never subject to any individualized suspicion 
whatsoever.  Essentially, law enforcement is sifting through the 
DNA and genealogy of countless random individuals who are 
distantly related to a perpetrator whose identity they do not know.  
This cannot meet the individualized suspicion requirement.  
Nevertheless, the intimate information of these individuals is 
utilized in criminal investigations without any legal or judicial 
oversight.  This is more akin to a fishing expedition than a search 
with a reasonably limited scope and reasonably likely results.  
Familial searching in recreational DNA databases, it seems, is  
the “too permeating police surveillance”130 that the Fourth 
Amendment was designed to protect against. 
2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy  
Due to the unique nature of DNA, current reasonable 
expectation of privacy jurisprudence provides an insufficient 
standard to protect the DNA stored in recreational databases.  
“[T]he protections of the Fourth Amendment are activated only 
when the state conducts a search or seizure in an area in which 
there is a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy.’ ”131  Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has recognized 
two requirements that must be fulfilled in order for a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to be established:  where an individual seeks 
to preserve things as private and where the subject is something 
society is reasonably prepared to recognize as private.132  “When 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy,” however, “the 
Fourth Amendment is not implicated.”133 
In determining whether a person has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, the Supreme Court has often highlighted the 
importance of one’s ability to exclude others in order to preserve 
one’s privacy.  In Katz, the Court explained that a person may have 
 
130 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (quoting United States v. Di 
Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
131 United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 241 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting New York v. 
Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986)). 
132 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (“When an individual ‘seeks to preserve 
something as private,’ and his expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable,’ we have held that official intrusion into that private 
sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable 
cause.” (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979))).  
133 Davis, 690 F.3d at 241. 
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a reasonable expectation of privacy in that which she “seeks to 
preserve as private” not only in her own home, but “even in an area 
accessible to the public.”134  In addition, the Court in Rakas v. 
Illinois explained that having a reasonable expectation of privacy 
is not always a function of having a proprietary interest, but may 
also exist where an individual has a “sufficient interest” in, and 
the ability to exclude others from, that which she seeks to preserve 
as private.135  In Rakas, the Court reiterated the reasoning in  
Katz that the “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded 
place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of 
the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
invaded place.”136  The Court in Rakas determined that the 
defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
particular places in which a car was searched, not only because 
they owned neither the car nor the items seized, but also because 
the glove compartment and areas under the seats are not places in 
which passengers would “normally have a legitimate expectation 
of privacy.”137  In its reasoning, the Court contrasted the facts of 
Rakas with those of Jones, where “Jones had complete dominion 
and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it,” 
and those of Katz, where Katz was able to close the door to  
the telephone booth “to exclude all others.”138  The Court’s 
juxtaposition and comparison of the facts of these three cases 
reiterates the importance of a person’s ability to exclude others to 
whether that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
 
 
 
134 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (holding that Katz had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth because he “occupie[d] it, shut[] 
the door behind him, and pa[id] the toll that permit[ted] him to place a call”).  
135 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978). The Rakas Court illustrated this 
using the facts of Jones v. United States as an example, where Jones was held to have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a friend’s apartment where he was staying, 
when “[t]he friend had given him permission to use the apartment and a key to it.” Id. 
at 141 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960)). 
136 Id. at 143. In Rakas, police seized a sawed-off rifle and shells, which the 
defendants did not own, from the glove compartment and under the seats of a car, 
which the defendants were passengers in but did not own. Id. at 129. 
137 Id. at 148–49.  
138 Id. at 149. 
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Although society has long recognized that people have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their bodies,139 Fourth 
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy precedent does not 
map onto DNA in recreational DNA databases.  In 2012, the 
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Davis took a step forward in 
establishing that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the information that her own DNA may provide, due to the 
ability of DNA to reveal deeply private information about that 
person.140  However, this precedent does not go far enough in 
protecting DNA in recreational databases.  Even if a person 
affirmatively chooses not to submit her DNA to a recreational 
database in order to exclude others and to maintain her genetic 
privacy, she has no control over whether a distant relative will 
reveal portions of this information on her behalf.141  Furthermore, 
the law is murky when it comes to whether a genetic relative may 
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA of another 
genetic relative.  While a substantial amount of case law has 
defined the contours of the reasonable expectation of privacy in 
different scenarios, the same cannot be said for DNA, which may 
involve relatives regardless of whether they have chosen to 
preserve their own DNA as private.   
An additional wrinkle in Fourth Amendment reasonable 
expectation of privacy jurisprudence is that an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished when she is 
arrested.142  Maryland v. King, decided by the Supreme Court in 
2013, addressed the issue of whether it is a Fourth Amendment 
violation for law enforcement, without a warrant, to collect and 
analyze DNA from persons arrested on felony charges but not yet 
convicted.143  The  Court held that in this context, obtaining an 
 
139 United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 243 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause the 
analysis of biological samples . . . can reveal ‘physiological data’ and a ‘host of private 
medical facts,’ such analyses may ‘intrude[] upon expectations of privacy that society 
has long recognized as reasonable.’ ” (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989)). 
140 Id. at 243–44. 
141 See Murphy, supra note 36, at e8 (“[T]he fact that a fifth cousin once removed 
uploaded their DNA to an online site means that the government still has one’s  
profile, anyway.”). 
142 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 462–63 (2013) (“The expectations of privacy 
of an individual taken into police custody ‘necessarily [are] of a diminished 
scope.’ . . . [U]nlike the search of a citizen who has not been suspected of a wrong, a 
detainee has a reduced expectation of privacy.” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
557 (1979)). 
143 Id. at 442. 
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arrestee’s DNA as a “part of a routine booking procedure” is 
reasonable and does not require a warrant.144  Comparing this 
practice to photographing or fingerprinting arrestees,145 the Court 
reasoned that arrestees “in valid police custody for . . . serious 
offense[s] supported by probable cause” have a decreased 
expectation of privacy that is outweighed by the government’s 
legitimate interest in safely and accurately identifying people in 
its custody.146 
Unlike DNA samples collected from arrestees, the DNA 
contained in recreational databases is voluntarily provided by free 
individuals who submitted their DNA samples to these websites.  
We must presume that at least some individuals who affirmatively 
choose not to submit their DNA, but are genetically related to 
individuals who do, are free individuals.  In this context, it is the 
general public that is affected, not a subgroup of individuals who 
may have a diminished expectation of privacy due to contact with 
the criminal justice system.  Thus, the reasonable expectation of 
privacy that free individuals have in their DNA is undermined by 
its use in criminal investigations without legal protection. 
Furthermore, the court in Davis was careful to clarify that 
even a victim of a crime, whose DNA “has come into the lawful 
possession of the police,” maintains a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in her DNA.147  The court expressed concern that such 
citizens would “lose any expectation of privacy in [their DNA], 
which could be used against [them] at a later date without the 
constitutional safeguard that a warrant supported by probable 
cause first be issued.”148  Just as the Davis court was concerned 
with protecting this type of information when it came to free 
individuals in the criminal context, this concern for protection 
must be expanded to DNA in the recreational context as well. 
Additionally, there is a general sense in society that DNA 
should be recognized as something private, and thus protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.149  While traditional Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence deals mainly with physical spaces and property and 
not the more abstract and intangible type of information that DNA 
is and how it can be accessed, in the context of DNA in recreational 
 
144 Id. at 465–66. 
145 Id. at 451. 
146 Id. at 448, 449. 
147 United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 244 (4th Cir. 2012). 
148 Id. 
149 See Jouvenal et al., supra note 22. 
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databases the Supreme Court’s judicious words in 1925 remain 
relevant today: “The Fourth Amendment is to be construed . . . in 
a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the 
interests and rights of individual citizens.”150  Because the DNA in 
recreational DNA databases, as compared to the DNA in CODIS, 
has the ability to provide an enormous amount of personal and 
intimate information about individuals,151  DNA in these 
databases must be protected from uninhibited use by law 
enforcement in criminal investigations.  DNA is different in that 
while there is a feeling in society that this type of information is 
deserving of privacy protections, there is simultaneously a 
fundamental inability to exclude others from revealing this 
information.  Because current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy does not protect 
DNA stored in recreational DNA databases, and because it does 
not protect individuals genetically related to individuals in such 
databases, statutory protections are necessary to allow individuals 
to exclude others in a way that people are not currently capable of 
doing themselves. 
3. Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine provides that when a person 
voluntarily gives her information to a third-party, she no longer 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, “even 
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be 
used only for a limited purpose.”152  The government may thus 
access this information without concern for Fourth Amendment 
protections.153  In Carpenter, the Supreme Court considered the 
limits of the third-party doctrine in light of modern technology, 
and determined that due to the extensive and revealing nature  
of CSLI information and the fact that it is automatically  
collected, the third-party doctrine did not override the need  
for Fourth Amendment protection.154  The Court explained  
that, because cell phones are “indispensable to participation  
in modern society,” and because CSLI records are created 
automatically when a cell phone is operated, CSLI is “not truly 
 
150 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
151 See Murphy, supra note 36, at e5.  
152 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (quoting United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 2223. 
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‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”155  Thus, the 
Court reasoned, “in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily 
‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his 
physical movements.”156 
Similarly, due to the extensive and revealing nature of the 
DNA data provided to recreational databases, Fourth Amendment 
protections should override the third-party doctrine.  First, 
although individuals voluntarily submit their DNA to these 
services, the information is provided for limited purposes.  
Although alone, this is not enough to override the third-party 
doctrine, the extent of what DNA may reveal about an individual, 
together with the likelihood that individuals who submit their 
DNA samples do not fully understand what they are providing, 
demonstrates the need for additional protection.  The Court 
conceded in Carpenter that its interpretation and application of 
the third-party doctrine “must take account of more sophisticated 
[technology] that [is] already in use or in development.”157  The 
rapidly evolving study of what DNA can reveal must be taken into 
account when considering the level of protection it receives. 
Second, DNA is different from CSLI due to its unique ability 
to implicate genetic relatives, which creates what has been called 
a “fourth-party problem.”158  Fourth parties are those who have not 
submitted their own DNA samples, but are genetically related to 
people who have, and can thus be pulled into criminal 
investigations anyway.  Put simply, “[i]f you’re upset that your 
brother has uploaded his DNA to a commercial DNA 
database . . . you don’t really have any legal rights to complain if 
the police decide, for example, to collect that DNA or to analyze it 
or take a look at it.”159  These individuals do not fall into the 
category of individuals subject to the third-party doctrine, nor do 
Fourth Amendment protections adequately protect their 
reasonable expectations of privacy in their own DNA.  Because 
DNA is different, these people fall through the cracks between 
legal protections.  A person “shouldn’t have fewer civil rights 
because [she is] related to someone who broke the law.”160 
 
155 Id. at 2220. 
156 Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)). 
157 Id. at 2218 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)). 
158 Ford, supra note 13. 
159 Id. 
160 Rosenberg, supra note 129.  
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4. Consent 
While a warrantless search may be constitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment if the person being searched consents to it,161 
consent is not a valid argument in the context of DNA in 
recreational databases.  First, the consent given by users of these 
genealogy services is not truly informed consent.  Second, even if 
an individual does give fully informed consent, she is effectively 
giving this consent on behalf of all her genetic relatives.  Similarly, 
the option to opt out of allowing one’s DNA to be used in forensic 
investigations is insufficient due to the ability of another genetic 
relative to opt in. 
Consent given by individuals who submit their DNA  
to recreational databases is not truly informed consent.162  The 
consent that individuals provide is often hidden deep in the fine 
print of the terms and conditions of these services.163  Even if a 
person takes the time to read the entirety of the terms and 
conditions, that person may not understand the extent of what she 
has consented to and what the agreement will allow the company 
to do with her DNA.164  Those who submit their information to 
recreational DNA databases to learn more about their own 
genealogy or health predispositions likely have not fully 
contemplated, nor do they fully understand, the extent of what 
their DNA may reveal or how it can be used now or in the future.165  
Individuals likely do not have a true understanding of “the 
downstream applications of their pooled genetic profiles,” and the 
implications of “third-party access” to this information.166  
Additionally, the privacy statements and the terms and conditions 
 
161 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
162 See Kimberlee Sue Moran, Damned By DNA – Balancing Personal Privacy 
With Public Safety, 292 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e3, e4 (2018). 
163 Id. 
164 Maggie Fox, What You’re Giving Away with Those Home DNA Tests, NBC 
NEWS (Nov. 29, 2017, 6:16 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/what-
you-re-giving-away-those-home-dna-tests-n824776.  
165 Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14. 
166 Moran, supra note 162, at e4. For example, 23andMe shares this information 
with “academic and industry partners” for medical research purposes and “cannot 
guarantee what will happen to the information once it leaves their hands.” Scutti, 
What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14; see also Rubén Rosario, 
Opinion, Rosario: Familial DNA Searches Are Becoming a Useful Cop Tool in Cold 
Cases, PIONEER PRESS (Mar. 1, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2019/03/ 
01/rosario-familial-dna-searches-are-becoming-a-useful-cop-tool-in-cold-cases/ (“I was 
wary of giving out my DNA. I did it anyway. But most of us really don’t know how 
accessible our genetic profiles, and, indirectly, those of family members, might be to 
third parties, including the government, by willingly using these sites.”). 
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of use of recreational DNA services is often very broad and subject 
to change at any time.167  Thus, “[w]ithout greater transparency 
about the number and nature of recreational genetic searches, it 
is impossible for the public to reach an informed decision about 
their permissible scope.”168 
In the context of DNA, individuals have the unique ability  
to essentially, and likely unknowingly, disclose the genetic 
relationships between themselves and their genetic relatives  
on behalf of their genetic relatives.  Simply requiring a party’s 
consent to access her DNA data does not address the issue because 
the privacy rights of relatives are automatically compromised  
by access to the data.  When an individual gives consent to 
recreational DNA databases to use her DNA, “[s]uch consent is not 
limited to the individual user’s DNA.  It extends to everyone who 
shares that genetic information—past, present, and future.”169  
Critically, when people consent to sharing their DNA with such a 
service, it is unlikely that they are considering “the genetic privacy 
of their distant relatives.”170  Moreover, it is highly unlikely that 
before consenting to the use of their DNA by commercial genealogy 
services, consumers considered the possibility that “intimate 
pieces of their DNA” could be utilized by law enforcement in 
criminal investigations.171  Individuals are generally accustomed 
to having a choice in whether and when to share their private 
information with others.  After all, the information is private.  
DNA, however, is different. 
Some may argue that providing users of recreational DNA 
databases with an opt-out option resolves the issue of informed 
consent.  The argument would be that providing an opt-out option 
restores users’ ability to give informed consent by choosing not to 
delete their genetic information and profiles from databases once 
they learn that their data may be used in ways not originally 
contemplated, like in criminal investigations.172  This argument, 
 
167 See supra Section II.A.1.  
168 Murphy, supra note 36, at e7. 
169 Moran, supra note 162, at e4. 
170 Ritter, supra note 19. 
171 Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1. “[N]o consent has been given by the 
contributors to a genealogical collection for their DNA to be used in a way that might 
implicate their relatives in a committed crime.” Denise Syndercombe Court, Forensic 
Genealogy: Some Serious Concerns, 36 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 203, 203 (2018). 
172 Soon after the arrest of the Golden State Killer, GEDMatch highlighted an 
opt-out option for its users, posting the following announcement on the GEDMatch 
website:  
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however, completely ignores DNA’s unique ability to implicate 
one’s relatives and thus does not solve the nonconsent issue.  The 
issue remains that the decision to maintain one’s genetic privacy 
is not in the hands of that individual.  Even if a person makes the 
decision to delete her DNA data that she had once submitted to a 
recreational database, she cannot be guaranteed that any of her 
relatives who submitted their DNA would make the same 
decision.173  Furthermore, a person who never submitted her own 
DNA in the first place cannot be guaranteed that her relatives 
would choose to opt out.  In both situations, individuals who chose 
to maintain their genetic privacy are implicated regardless of their 
personal decisions, and the power to consent to a potential genetic 
privacy waiver remains with someone else.  
Stated another way, one person’s DNA submission to a 
recreational DNA database may effectively serve as a waiver of 
that person’s individual privacy in her own DNA, as well as that 
of countless others who may have otherwise chosen to keep this 
information private.174  It is becoming ever more likely that any 
given person will have at least a distant relative in “a publicly 
searchable database.”175  Critically, even if individuals consent to 
waiving their privacy interest in their DNA, “they’re also 
[consenting for] their extended family, their children, [and] their 
children’s children. . . . And they’re not just [consenting] for” the 
present year, but for years in the future as well, “when data from 
the genome could be used in all sorts of different ways.”176  “The 
reckless handover of DNA erodes our ability to collectively protect 
our personal privacy and violates the privacy of those genetically 
related but who have not given their explicit consent to be included 
in a database.”177  
 
While the database was created for genealogical research, it is important 
that GEDmatch participants understand the possible uses of their DNA, 
including identification of relatives that have committed crimes or were 
victims of crimes. If you are concerned about non-genealogical uses of your 
DNA, you should not upload your DNA to the database and/or you should 
remove DNA that has already been uploaded. 
Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1.  
173 Molteni, supra note 12 (“You can’t claw back the profile of your third cousin 
once removed who you don’t even know exists.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
174 Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1 (“Suppose you are worried about genetic 
privacy. . . . If your sibling or parent or child engaged in this activity online, they are 
compromising your family for generations.”). 
175 Ritter, supra note 19.  
176 Jouvenal et al., supra note 22. 
177 Moran, supra note 162, at e4. 
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B. No Statutory Protections Exist for DNA Stored in 
Recreational DNA Databases 
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 went 
into effect on May 21, 2008.178  The purpose of this Act was “[t]o 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of genetic information with 
respect to health insurance and employment.”179  In making the 
determination that this Act was necessary to protect individuals 
from the potential consequences of scientific progress, Congress 
recognized that the advances in genetic science and testing may 
“give rise to the potential misuse of genetic information to 
discriminate in health insurance and employment.”180  While some 
argue that this Act may not have gone far enough to protect 
individuals from genetic discrimination, it provides no protection 
whatsoever for DNA in recreational databases.181  Just as there 
are protections regarding the provision of this type of information 
to doctors and health insurance companies, protections regarding 
law enforcement’s access to and use of this type of information 
must be protected as well. 
While some statutes do exist to protect the DNA information 
stored in CODIS and to regulate how such information may be 
used, these regulations vary widely.  For example, “[w]hile familial 
searching is not performed at the national level,”182 states differ as 
to whether they use familial searching at all and as to what limits 
are placed on the practice.  Currently, only a number of states 
allow familial searching: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.183  While Illinois and 
 
178 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 
Stat. 881 (2008). 
179 Id. 
180 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2, 
122 Stat. 881 (2008). 
181 Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14 (“[T]he act does 
not apply to companies with fewer than 15 employees, and ‘other forms of insurance 
including life, disability and long-term care are not covered by [the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act].’ ” (quoting Jeremy Gruber)). 
182 Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited Oct. 18, 
2019).  
183 James Rainey, Familial DNA Puts Elusive Killers Behind Bars. But Only 12 
States Use It., NBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
news/us-news/familial-dna-puts-elusive-killers-behind-bars-only-12-states-n869711; 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited Oct. 18, 
2019).  
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Louisiana are currently considering whether to allow familial 
searching in CODIS, Maryland and Washington D.C. have chosen 
not to allow the use of this technique at all.184  However, while 
minimal regulations protect DNA information in CODIS, there are 
currently no laws regulating familial searching using recreational 
DNA websites.185  
As the DNA testing that is currently performed by 
recreational DNA services is “more sophisticated than the DNA 
tests police currently run, and . . . generate[s] more data than is 
stored in the FBI’s CODIS database,” this lack of statutory 
protection is, at the very least, alarming.186  “[S]earches in 
recreational databases affect a far greater number of innocent 
persons, and are conducted with no oversight or governance of any 
kind.”187  Strikingly, the STR-tested DNA in CODIS, collected from 
individuals with a decreased expectation of privacy, is more 
protected than the SNP-tested DNA of innocent individuals in the 
recreational context.188 
For example, a number of simple regulations exist for 
laboratories conducting searches in CODIS, which “represent an 
effort to balance the right of individuals to genetic privacy, and to 
be free from government intrusion in the absence of suspicion, 
against the desire to apprehend law breakers.”189  Such regulations 
include requirements that “[a]ll genetic material tested for upload 
into the database . . . be done by accredited laboratories and 
qualified personnel,” that any DNA sample submitted must be 
from “a ‘putative perpetrator’ . . . [and not] profiles derived from 
evidence that may [only] have a remote connection to the crime, or 
from a mere witness or bystander.”190  
 
 
184 Rainey, supra note 183. 
185 Murphy, supra note 36, at e6. In January 2019, Maryland legislators 
introduced a bill that seeks to extend the state’s ban on familial searching in CODIS 
to cover consumer genetic databases as well. Natalie Jones, Maryland Bill Seeks to 
Prohibit Using DNA Databases to Solve Crime, NBC WASH. (Feb. 21, 2019, 7:22 AM), 
https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Bill-Seeks-to-Prohibit-Using-DNA-
Databases-to-Solve-Crime-506147871.html. As of this writing, the bill remains 
adjourned sine die. Maryland House Bill 30, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/MD/bill/ 
HB30/2019 (last visited Sep. 17, 2019). 
186 Zhang, The Coming Wave of Murders Solved, supra note 12. 
187 Murphy, supra note 36, at e5. 
188 See id. at e7. 
189 Id. at e6. 
190 Id. 
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In addition to regulating the use of CODIS, jurisdictions that 
allow for familial DNA searches often “supplement these 
requirements with [additional] policies.”191  Some limits that have 
been enacted include only permitting familial searching to be used 
“to solve the most serious cases,” and establishing “[a] separate 
oversight committee [to] determine[] when a familial match is 
strong enough to disclose it to local investigators.”192  Some policies 
also require “that any incidental findings (e.g., non-paternity) are 
distanced from local law enforcement,” and that “[w]innowing of 
leads” be accomplished “through public or police resources, so as 
to minimize the intrusion on persons ultimately ruled out as a 
potential lead or suspect.”193 
In stark contrast, no such regulations exist surrounding the 
use of familial searching in recreational DNA databases.194  This 
currently provides law enforcement with the ability to conduct in 
recreational databases the searches that they are prohibited from 
conducting in CODIS.195  For example, there are no laws or 
regulations currently preventing law enforcement from engaging 
in “fishing expedition[s]” to find not only perpetrators of crimes, 
but individuals tangentially related to the crimes.196  And once 
individuals are pinpointed, there are no current laws regulating 
the types of follow-up investigations that law enforcement may 
conduct.197  “[A] genealogical detective,” for example, “can take 
endless amounts of surreptitious samples, . . . [and] sneak 
sampl[e] persons in the ‘family tree’ even though they are not 
suspects, simply because such samples might help expedite  
the investigation by eliminating potential suspect ‘branches.’ ”198  
The result of this regulatory imbalance is simple and 
nonsensical—“the immediate sibling of a convicted offender  
 
 
 
191 Id. 
192 Id. (referencing policies adopted in California). 
193 Id. (referencing policies adopted in California). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at e7. 
196 Id. at e6. This technique may currently be used not only to identify 
perpetrators, but “victims, witnesses, [and] bystanders” as well. Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. In the search for the Golden State Killer, police surreptitiously collected 
DNA samples from two individual suspects who turned out to be innocent. Id. 
“Samples could . . . be taken from victims, victims’ family members or loved ones, or 
purported witnesses to a crime—all without those persons knowing that they had been 
targeted by police.” Id. at e6–e7. 
800	 ST.	JOHN’S	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	93:767			
has greater protection against genetic surveillance . . . than  
a distant biological relation of a person interested in  
recreational genomics.”199 
III. COMMON COUNTERARGUMENTS AND WHY THEY ARE FLAWED 
A. The Government’s Interest in Identifying Criminals Does Not 
Completely Outweigh the Individual’s Interest in Genetic 
Privacy 
The government has a strong interest in identifying criminals 
for the dual purposes of apprehending them and preventing future 
crimes, and many argue that this government interest outweighs 
the interest of the individual in maintaining her genetic privacy.  
In Maryland v. King, police took a DNA sample from King “[a]s 
part of a routine booking procedure for serious offenses,” and his 
DNA was later found to be a match to DNA obtained from a rape 
victim in an unrelated case.200  Holding that “DNA identification 
of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of 
a routine booking procedure,”201 the Supreme Court recognized the 
government’s strong interest in identification as it pertains  
to persons in custody and analogized the use of DNA  
for identification purposes to law enforcement’s use of 
fingerprinting.202  The Supreme Court reasoned that DNA, like a 
fingerprint, can provide “an irrefutable identification of the person 
from whom it was taken,” and that neither fingerprints nor DNA 
are “themselves evidence of any particular crime.”203  The Court 
further explained that because law enforcement already uses 
routine techniques like fingerprinting and utilization of mug shots 
to identify individuals, “[t]he only difference between DNA 
analysis and the accepted use of fingerprint databases is the 
unparalleled accuracy DNA provides.”204 
 
 
199 Id. at e7. 
200 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 440 (2013). 
201 Id. at 465. 
202 Id. at 449, 451. 
203 Id. at 451. 
204 Id. at 436, 451 (“A DNA profile is useful to police because it gives them a form 
of identification to search the records already in their valid possession. In this respect 
the use of DNA for identification is no different than matching an arrestee’s face to a 
wanted poster of a previously unidentified suspect . . . or matching the arrestee’s 
fingerprints to those recovered from a crime scene.”). 
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Outstandingly, the Court overlooked the essential feature of 
DNA—the vast wealth of information it contains—and failed to 
take into consideration this fundamental difference between DNA 
and other identification techniques, like fingerprinting.  It would 
be difficult to overstate how much more revealing DNA data is 
than a fingerprint.  Neither a fingerprint nor a mug shot has the 
capability of doing much more than assisting law enforcement in 
confirming the identify of a single individual.  In contrast, even in 
the criminal context, the STR DNA used in CODIS has the ability 
to reveal more, with the potential to point to a person’s immediate 
relatives.205  This is not to mention the myriad details that the SNP 
DNA stored in recreational DNA databases can reveal about an 
individual and her extended relatives.206  Furthermore, modern 
genetic science likely has not scratched the tip of the iceberg in 
determining what SNP DNA, or even what we currently dub “junk 
DNA,” may be able to reveal.207 
Regardless, the Court’s logic has not been extended to law 
enforcement’s use of recreational DNA databases to conduct  
such searches, especially when the search is conducted  
without individualized suspicion.  When there is such a lack of 
individualized suspicion, the Supreme Court has noted that “the 
reasonableness of a search ‘is determined by assessing, on the one 
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s 
[reasonable expectation of] privacy and, on the other, the degree 
to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental  
 
 
205 See supra Section I.A. 
206 See supra Section I.A. 
207 See, e.g., What are the Next Steps in Gemonic Research?, NAT’L INST. HEALTH 
(Jan. 7, 2020), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/nextsteps (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2020) (“Discovering the sequence of the human genome was only the first step 
in understanding how the instructions coded in DNA lead to a functioning human 
being. The next stage of genomic research will begin to derive meaningful knowledge 
from the DNA sequence. Research studies that build on the work of the Human 
Genome Project are under way worldwide.”); see also, e.g., What is the Encyclopedia of 
DNA Elements (ENCODE) Project?, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Jan. 7, 2020), 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/encode (last visted Jan. 13, 2020) 
(“The approximately 20,000 genes that provide instructions for making proteins 
account for only about 1 percent of the human genome. Researchers embarked on the 
ENCODE Project to figure out the purpose of the remaining 99 percent of the genome. 
Scientists discovered that more than 80 percent of this non-gene component of the 
genome, which was once considered ‘junk DNA,’ actually has a role in regulating the 
activity of particular genes (gene expression).”). 
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interests.’ ”208  Importantly, our system of justice “do[es] not accept 
even [a] small level of intrusion, [such as fingerprinting] for free 
persons without Fourth Amendment constraint.”209  
Here, the government’s interest in identification of criminals 
must be weighed against the interests of free individuals in 
maintaining control over their genetic privacy.  While the 
government and society have a strong interest in identifying 
criminals—particularly violent criminals like serial killers and 
rapists—keeping them off the streets, and preventing crimes, this 
should not be permitted at the complete expense of individuals’ 
genetic privacy without regulations or Fourth Amendment 
protection.  While the Fourth Amendment requires that searches 
be reasonable, “what is reasonable depends on the context within 
which a search takes place.”210  Here, DNA’s extremely revealing 
nature and its ability to implicate countless individuals tips the 
balance toward the interest of the individual in a way that 
fingerprinting simply does not. 
B. The Anonymization of Genetic Information in Recreational 
Databases is Ineffective and Thus Insufficient to Protect 
Genetic Privacy 
Some may argue that because recreational DNA companies 
anonymize the genetic information stored in their databases, 
individuals’ genetic privacy is sufficiently protected.  However, 
this solution is superficial and unrealistic.  First, it is important to 
note that DNA submitted to recreational DNA websites often does 
not remain solely with those websites.  In fact, many commercial 
genealogy companies ultimately plan to sell customers’ genetic 
information to pharmaceutical companies or medical researchers, 
if they do not do so already.211  Additionally, commercial sites have 
little control as to where this information may eventually end 
 
208 United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 247 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006)). 
209 Id. at 245 (quoting Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992)).  
210 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 461–62 (2013) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)). 
211 See Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14. For 
example, GlaxoSmithKline recently reached a deal with 23andMe to acquire a $300 
million stake in the genealogy company. Brodwin, supra note 93. GlaxoSmithKline 
plans to use 23andMe’s data “to look for new drugs to develop . . . [and] inform how 
patients are selected for clinical trials.” Id.; see also infra note 123 (Verogen Inc.’s 
purchase of GEDmatch). “We ask these sites to be responsible stewards of our 
information, but they are nevertheless subject to incentives to make millions by 
selling our data to others.” Bala, supra note 25. 
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up.212  Frighteningly, the inability to determine who possesses 
one’s genetic information may mean that it could be 
extraordinarily difficult to prove that an employer or insurer is 
engaging in genetic discrimination and subject to the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act, if one even suspects such  
a possibility.213 
Second, while commercial genealogy companies contend that 
any genetic information shared with the company is anonymized, 
true anonymization can neither be achieved nor guaranteed.214  
Benjamin Berkman, a National Institutes of Health bioethicist, 
stated that while companies can tout all the “procedural and 
technical safeguards . . . put in place to protect the confidentiality 
of [people’s] data,” anonymity can, nevertheless, not be 
promised.215  This is because a person’s anonymized DNA can be 
re-identified in a fairly simplistic way.  In a recent study, for 
example, Yaniv Erlich’s team found that “[o]nce relatives are 
found, an anonymous person can be re-identified by constructing 
a family tree, searching for additional relatives and then 
triangulating from there.”216  In this way, Erlich’s team was able 
to “re-identif[y] a woman from her ‘anonymous’—though publicly 
available—DNA information.”217  
Most concerning in the criminal context, however, is a recent 
study that found that DNA may be used to identify individuals and 
their relatives by cross-referencing the STR DNA in CODIS with 
the SNP DNA in recreational databases and vice versa.218  This 
 
212 Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14 (“When a 
company shares de-dentified [sic] and aggregated data with partners they [sic] cannot 
guarantee what will happen to the information once it leaves their hands.”); Brodwin, 
supra note 93 (“[L]eaks can happen, and privacy advocates say that such incidents 
could allow your data to find its way elsewhere, perhaps without your knowledge.”).  
213 Fox, supra note 164. 
214 Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14 (“[W]hen it 
comes to ‘anonymizing’ DNA, it is so far impossible to truly do so . . . .”). 
215 Stein, supra note 16. 
216 Susan Scutti, You Might Not Be Anonymous, Thanks To Genealogy Databases, 
CNN (Oct. 11, 2018, 3:47 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/11/health/genetic-
privacy-study/index.html [hereinafter Scutti, You Might Not Be Anonymous]. 
217 Id. The team was able to successfully re-identify this woman “using her 
anonymized DNA profile and birth date, which is often publicly available to 
researchers.” Kaiser, supra note 17. Notably, this was not the first time that attempts 
to re-identify “anonymous” DNA samples were successful. In 2013, researchers at the 
Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research re-identified “[fifty] people from DNA 
donated anonymously for scientific study using easily available internet databases.” 
Fox, supra note 164. 
218 See Jaehee Kim et al., Statistical Detection of Relatives Typed with Disjoint 
Forensic and Biomedical Loci, 175 CELL 848, 848 (2018).  
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discovery is significant in that it suggests the use of commercial 
and criminal DNA databases in ways “not intended in the context 
of either database examined in isolation.”219  Noah Rosenberg, one 
of the authors of the study, explained the significance  
simply, stating that “[d]ifferent databases constructed for different 
purposes might independently not provide enough information to 
reveal a person’s identity but by combining information from 
multiple databases identifications can be made.”220  A recreational 
DNA profile linked to a profile in CODIS, for example, 
“could . . . reveal physical appearance or medical information for a 
criminal or their relatives, such as genes for eye color or a disease, 
even though the forensic databases aren’t supposed to contain that 
kind of information.”221  Again, this raises a significant privacy 
concern not only for free individuals who may or may not have 
submitted their DNA to commercial companies but who are 
nevertheless included in such searches, but also for individuals 
who have come into contact with the criminal justice system and 
have DNA profiles in CODIS.  This is yet another scenario where 
anonymization of genetic information in DNA databases falls 
short in protecting individuals’ genetic privacy. 
C. Despite the Time Consuming and Work-Intensive Nature of 
Familial Searching, Stringent Regulation Is Necessary 
While it is unclear how often law enforcement conducts 
familial searches in recreational and commercial DNA 
databases,222 some try to mitigate the concerns surrounding the 
technique by arguing that it will not be used frequently, as it 
requires a substantial amount of time and personpower.223  The 
argument is that familial searching in recreational DNA 
databases has the potential to “generate an extraordinary number 
of leads, and running them all down using both nongenetic and 
genetic information requires a lot of police power.”224  The accuracy 
of this statement is demonstrated by the effort to identify Joseph 
James DeAngelo Jr. as the Golden State Killer, which entailed “a 
 
219 Id. 
220 Scutti, You Might Not Be Anonymous, supra note 216. 
221 Kaiser, supra note 17. 
222 Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1; Hesman Saey, supra note 8 (“[T]here’s no 
telling how many people in . . . public database[s] are being subjected to what amounts 
to a ‘genetic stop and frisk.’ ”). 
223 Hesman Saey, supra note 8; Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1 (“I doubt it will be 
run of the mill any time soon.”). 
224 Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1. 
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team of five investigators [who] spent four months building out 
family trees, name by name.  [The team] pored over census 
records, newspaper obituaries, gravesite locaters, and police and 
commercial databases to find each relative and, ultimately, 
DeAngelo.”225  Furthermore, others note that the concerns 
surrounding increased forensic use of recreational DNA databases 
are overstated.226  An investigative genetic genealogist, for 
example, criticized recent studies that demonstrate the vast 
identification capabilities of DNA in recreational databases, and 
argued that the researchers “ma[d]e a lot of assumptions that 
aren’t in line with reality, . . . [by] assuming some head-starts” not 
necessarily available to investigative genealogists.227 
However, neither infrequent use of familial searching in 
recreational DNA databases nor inconsistent access of 
investigators to “critical demographic information”228 present 
sufficient rationales for not protecting genetic information.  The 
necessity of Fourth Amendment protection is not premised upon 
how much effort it would take law enforcement to access one’s 
information, and the public need not place trust in law 
enforcement’s voluntary decisions regarding whether or not to 
utilize familial searching in recreational DNA databases.229  
Furthermore, as genetic research and computer technology 
advance, it is not unforeseeable that less personpower would be 
required to utilize this technique in the future.230  While it took 
investigators four months to identify the Golden State Killer, for 
example, it took the Sacramento District Attorney’s office only ten 
days to identify the NorCal Rapist using the same techniques.231  
Because it is impossible to predict the extent of the information 
 
225 Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
226 Johnson, supra note 15. 
227 Id. (“[R]eal cases would often lack the critical demographic information—such 
as the age and family tree—that the academic researchers used in their  
sample case.”). 
228 Id. 
229 Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57, 358–59 (1967). 
230 “[M]atches will become more frequent” as more people submit their DNA 
samples to recreational DNA services. Molteni, supra note 12. Furthermore, 
researchers are currently working to develop and “perfect rapid DNA machines [that] 
can generate DNA profiles within hours,” and it has been predicted that there may be 
“handheld DNA devices” within the next ten to twenty years. N’dea Yancey-Bragg, 
DNA is Cracking Mysteries and Cold Cases. But is Genome Sleuthing the 
 ‘Unregulated Wild West?’, USA TODAY (May 14, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2019/05/14/heres-how-dna-cracking-cold-cases-and-exonerating-
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231 Molteni, supra note 12. 
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DNA may reveal, how this information may be used in the future 
and by whom, and because the personal information of countless 
individuals is implicated, statutory protections are necessary to 
protect the information in these databases. 
IV. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO SAFEGUARD 
GENETIC INFORMATION STORED IN RECREATIONAL  
DNA DATABASES 
While law enforcement’s use of familial searching in 
commercial and recreational DNA databases is just beginning, 
there are indications that this technique may become more 
prevalent in the future.232  As the DNA stored in these databases 
will soon have the potential to identify nearly everyone, the 
privacy implications of forensic use of these databases are 
far-reaching.233  Furthermore, law enforcement’s unregulated 
access to the genetic information stored in these databases has the 
potential to result in unwarranted invasions of privacy, whether 
or not people volunteered their own DNA samples.  “A person’s 
privacy in the contents of each microscopic bundle of DNA should 
be more stringently protected because of the unpredictability  
and density of the genetic information it contains.”234  Without 
statutory protections, society must place its trust that genetic 
privacy will be respected and protected in the hands of companies 
that profit by exploiting this information.  Most unrealistically, 
these companies would have to voluntarily agree on how DNA 
information should be protected.235  It is thus imperative that 
statutory protections be implemented to safeguard individuals’ 
genetic privacy. 
Some statutory suggestions consider ways in which the 
genetic information itself may be protected.  For example, Yaniv 
Erlich recommends “that all genetic information be encrypted to 
 
232 See Zhang, The Coming Wave of Murders Solved, supra note 12 (highlighting 
one hundred crime scene DNA samples recently uploaded to GEDmatch); see also 
supra note 119 and associated text. 
233 Kaiser, supra note 17; see also Yancey-Bragg, supra note 230 (“It happens 
almost every week: Police reveal that DNA technology has helped them crack a 
decades-old case or identify an infamous serial killer like Jack the Ripper.”). 
234 Lowenberg, supra note 15, at 1311. 
235 Kaiser, supra note 17 (“[A]ll the players in the direct-to-consumer DNA 
sequencing industry would have to agree to [a] scheme . . . . ‘If not, we’re back to 
square one.’ ” (quoting Natalie Ram, a law professor at the University of Baltimore  
in Maryland)). 
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protect the information.”236  However, this suggestion alone is 
insufficient to protect genetic information and prevent DNA from 
being re-identified.  Even if a commercial genealogy company were 
to be required to encrypt the data submitted to it, this would not 
protect the genetic information already shared with medical 
researchers and pharmaceutical companies.  Furthermore, to 
maintain protection, every time the information was shared or 
sold, the information would have to be decrypted and the following 
party would then have to re-encrypt it.  Any statutory protection 
that includes encryption would have to require such a process. 
Other suggested statutory protections focus on the importance 
of informed consent and ensuring that people are aware of the 
possibility that their genetic information may be used in criminal 
investigations.  Denise Syndercombe Court, a professor in the 
Forensic Science Research Group at King’s College London, 
suggests that companies openly provide “information about both 
the benefits and risks to individuals,” instead of hiding this 
information in the terms of service.237  Erin Murphy, a professor of 
law at New York University, goes a step further, adding that 
“compulsory disclosure of law enforcement activity” should be 
required.238  While requiring such communication would be a step 
in the right direction with regard to individuals who submit their 
DNA directly to commercial genealogy companies, this solution 
does not address genetically related individuals’ lack of 
opportunity to provide informed consent.239 
Some have suggested banning familial searches in 
recreational DNA databases altogether.240  This suggestion may be 
too extreme, however, as it does not take into consideration the 
significant societal interest in solving past crimes and preventing 
future crimes, nor does it recognize that this tool may be useful if 
used properly.  A more realistic solution is one that would focus on 
limiting how and when familial searching in recreational DNA 
databases may be used.  A common suggestion is that the use of 
this technique be used sparingly, only to solve violent crimes like 
rape and murder,241 or only “when all other investigative 
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approaches have failed.”242  While there are significant differences 
in the STR DNA in CODIS and the SNP DNA in recreational 
databases, an important first step in regulating the use of  
familial searching in recreational databases would be to impose 
similar protections on the recreational databases as exist to 
regulate CODIS.243  
CONCLUSION 
While familial searching in recreational DNA databases may 
be an effective new tool for law enforcement, there currently exists 
a serious lack of protection for the genetic privacy of those who 
submitted DNA samples, and those to whom they are genetically 
related.  Like the CSLI information discussed in Carpenter v. 
United States, DNA information is profoundly revealing, 
illustrating a person’s fundamental personhood.244  DNA also has 
the unique ability to reveal who a person is related to, implicating 
countless others, past, present, and future.245  Again, as the 
Supreme Court proclaimed in Carpenter, “as ‘[s]ubtler and more 
far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to 
the Government’ [we must] ensure that the ‘progress of science’ 
does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”246  It remains to 
be seen whether the Supreme Court will deem DNA a unique type 
of data and whether it will find familial searching in recreational 
databases subject to Fourth Amendment protections.  In the 
meantime, the implementation of statutory protections is crucial 
to regulate whose DNA data may be accessed or used, by whom, 
how, and under what circumstances.  As Erin Murphy eloquently 
stated, “[b]ig genome data has arrived; it is time to do something 
more than gape in wonder at it.”247 
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